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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Jeffrey Bonkowski appeals from the order of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania granting the summary judgment motion filed by 
Defendant Oberg Industries, Inc. (“Oberg”) with respect to his 
claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  
In this appeal, the Court must interpret a Department of Labor 
(“DOL”) regulation—which states in relevant part that 
“[i]npatient care means an overnight stay in a hospital, 
hospice, or residential medical care facility.”  We conclude 
 3 
that “an overnight stay” means a stay in a hospital, hospice, or 
residential medical care facility for a substantial period of time 
from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by 
the individual’s time of admission and his or her time of 
discharge.  Because Bonkowski was admitted and discharged 
on the same calendar day, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order. 
 
I. 
 
 Bonkowski worked for Oberg (a manufacturer of 
precision components and tooling) as a wirecut operator and 
machinist.  He has a number of health conditions, including an 
aortic bicuspid (i.e., he has two heart valves as opposed to 
three) and diabetes.  He was diagnosed with a possible aortic 
aneurysm after he fainted in the woods in May 2010.  In 
addition, Bonkowski’s colon was removed. 
    
 On November 14, 2011, Bonkowski met with two 
supervisors (David Santi and Jeffrey Ambrose) in order to 
discuss his recent suspension for allegedly sleeping on the job.  
According to Bonkowski, he began to experience shortness of 
breath, chest pain, and dizziness, and Santi and Ambrose gave 
him permission to go home and continue their meeting the 
next day.  He clocked out at 5:18 p.m. and went home to try to 
slow down his breathing and heart rate.  Lisa Bonkowski 
testified at her deposition that her husband looked as “white as 
a ghost” and was clutching his chest.  (A345.)  Over the next 
few hours, Bonkowski unsuccessfully tried to slow down his 
heartbeat and catch his breath.   
 Shortly after 11 p.m., Bonkowski’s wife drove him to 
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Butler Memorial Hospital.  It appears that the couple arrived at 
the hospital shortly before midnight.  At his deposition, 
Bonkowski stated that “I just know that I arrived earlier, I 
remember just—when they were wheeling me in, I see a clock 
right in front of me and it was a few minutes before 12:00.”  
(A279.)  He was then admitted shortly after midnight on 
November 15, 2011. 
  
 Bonkowski underwent comprehensive testing at the 
hospital.  His wife was initially informed that he may need 
open heart surgery.  However, the tests did not find any 
complications with his heart condition or diabetes.  Bonkowski 
accordingly was released from Butler Memorial Hospital in 
the early evening hours of November 15, 2011.  He obtained a 
doctor’s note stating that “Jeff was hospitalized and is excused 
from work.”  (A361.)  When he was discharged from the 
hospital, Bonkowski was instructed to follow up with his 
primary care physician and cardiologist and to schedule an 
outpatient echocardiogram.  However, no restrictions were 
placed on his activities. 
  
 The record includes two documents from Butler 
Memorial Hospital:  (1) the “Discharged Inpatient Report” 
(A353-A359); and (2) the “Discharge Instructions” (A363).  
Summarizing the test results, the Discharged Inpatient Report 
identified the date of “Reg” as “11/15/11” and the date of 
“Disch.” as “11/15/11.”  (A353-A359.)  Likewise, the 
Discharge Instructions indicated that “11/15/11” was the 
“ADM-DT” and that Bonkowski was discharged on 
“11/15/11.”  (A363.) 
 On November 16, 2011, Lou Proviano, the head of 
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Oberg’s human resources department, notified Bonkowski that 
his employment was terminated because he had walked off the 
job on November 14, 2011.  In his subsequent deposition 
testimony, Proviano characterized Bonkowski’s time in the 
hospital as an “overnight situation.”  (See A292 (“It was a 
voicemail—it was a voicemail message that indicated that she 
was trying to get FMLA documentation from Jeff Ambrose, 
and the overnight situation usually doesn’t warrant an FMLA 
document at the time.”).) 
  
 Bonkowski filed the current FMLA action against 
Oberg.  He alleged two causes of action under the FMLA:  (1) 
Oberg retaliated against him for exercising his FMLA rights; 
and (2) Oberg interfered with his FMLA rights. 
    
 After the parties completed discovery, Oberg filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  In a January 17, 2014 order, 
the District Court granted Oberg’s motion, entering judgment 
in favor of Oberg and against Bonkowski.  In its 
accompanying memorandum opinion, the District Court 
determined that “no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff’s 
absence from work on November 15, 2011, was a qualifying 
absence under the FMLA entitling him to protection from 
Defendant’s interference or retaliation with his FMLA rights.”  
Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 501, 512 
(W.D. Pa. 2014).  In short, it rejected Bonkowski’s retaliation 
and interference claims because he did not have a “serious 
health condition” under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(A), i.e., “an 
illness, injury, impairment, or physical condition that involves 
(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical 
care facility,” and therefore was not entitled to leave under the 
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FMLA. 
   
 Specifically, the District Court was required to interpret 
29 C.F.R. § 825.114, which defines the terms “inpatient care” 
as “an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential 
medical facility, including any period of incapacity as defined 
in 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(b), or any subsequent treatment in 
connection with such inpatient care.”  Oberg asserted that “‘an 
overnight stay in a hospital’ means a stay in a hospital from 
‘one day to the next, measured by the inpatient’s date of 
admission and discharge.’”  Bonkowski, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 
510 (citation omitted).  According to the District Court, 
“Plaintiff argues that he stayed overnight at the hospital from 
November 14, 2011, to November 15, 2011, because he 
arrived at the hospital shortly before midnight and was 
discharged in the early evening of the following day.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Finding that the arguments offered by both 
sides were not sufficient to resolve this issue (and noting that 
neither the FMLA nor the DOL regulations define the term 
“overnight”), the District Court turned to dictionary definitions 
of “overnight,” “duration,” and “night” (as well as the 
definition of “night” adopted by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”)) to discern the ordinary meaning of § 
825.114’s “overnight stay” terminology. 
  
 The District Court ruled that “Plaintiff can establish he 
had a qualifying serious medical condition only if he is able to 
establish he spent the entire ‘night’ as an inpatient at the 
hospital’” and that “an ‘overnight stay’ at a hospital is a stay 
from sunset on one day to sunrise the next day.”  Id. at 511.  
Taking judicial notice of the sunset and sunrise times set out in 
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The Old Farmer’s Almanac, the District Court ascertained 
that, based on Butler Memorial Hospital’s zip code, the sun set 
at 5:02 p.m. on November 14, 2011 and rose at 7:07 a.m. on 
November 15, 2011.  According to the District Court, 
Bonkowski was required to “put forth evidence that he was in 
the hospital from November 14, 2011, at 5:02 p.m. until 
November 15, 2011, at 7:07 a.m. to show his condition 
qualified as a serious medical condition under the FMLA.”  Id.  
He failed to do so: 
 
The undisputed evidence in this case is that 
Plaintiff arrived at Butler Memorial Hospital 
shortly before midnight on November 14, 2011.  
He was admitted as an inpatient shortly after 
midnight on November 15, 2011.  He remained 
at the hospital as an inpatient until the evening 
of November 15, 2011.  The undisputed 
evidence of record shows that plaintiff did not 
stay overnight as an inpatient in the hospital 
because he did not arrive at the hospital until 
shortly before midnight on November 14, 2011, 
almost seven hours after the sun set that day.  
Plaintiff, therefore, failed to show that he spent 
the duration of the night at Butler Memorial 
Hospital. . .   
 
Id. at 511-12 (citations omitted). 
 
 The District Court found it unnecessary to follow the 
rationale of the Second Circuit’s ruling in Estate of Landers v. 
Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2008), and thereby conclude that 
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“Plaintiff’s arrival at Butler Memorial Hospital did not begin 
his inpatient stay; rather, plaintiff became an inpatient when he 
was formally admitted after midnight.”  Bonkowski, 992 F. 
Supp. 2d at 510 n.10.  “Based upon the plain meaning of the 
word ‘overnight,’ even considering the time prior to plaintiff’s 
formal admission, he did not stay overnight at the hospital.”  
Id. 
   
 The District Court likewise considered Bonkowski’s 
argument that he stayed overnight at the hospital because 
Butler Memorial Hospital designated him as an inpatient (and 
because The Free Dictionary defines an “inpatient” as “‘[a] 
patient who is admitted to a hospital or clinic for treatment that 
requires at least one overnight stay,’” id. at 509 n.9 (quoting 
The Free Dictionary, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/inpatient (last visited Jan. 
16, 2014))).  According to the District Court, his argument 
lacked merit because “inpatient care” is defined by the 
regulations as “an overnight stay, meaning a plaintiff must 
stay overnight to qualify as receiving in-patient care.”  Id.  
Butler Memorial Hospital’s designation at best meant that his 
condition required one overnight stay.  It “does not mean that 
plaintiff actually stayed overnight at the hospital, i.e., that he 
received inpatient care and is qualified for protection under the 
FMLA.”  Id. 
  
II. 
 
 Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 to address 
problems associated with “inadequate job security for 
employees who have serious health conditions that prevent 
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them from working for temporary periods.”1  29 U.S.C. § 
2601(a)(4).  The purpose of this statutory scheme is, inter alia, 
“to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of 
families, to promote the stability and economic security of 
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family 
integrity” as well as “to entitle employees to take reasonable 
leave for medical reasons.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1), (2).  It is 
undisputed that the FMLA constitutes “remedial legislation” 
that “must be broadly construed in order to give full effect to 
these purposes.”  Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery 
Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations 
omitted) (discussing Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); see 
also, e.g., Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 559 
                                                   
1  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
This Court exercises plenary review over a district 
court’s order granting a motion for summary judgment, 
applying the same standard that the district court ought to 
apply.  See, e.g., Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 
F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).  As the District Court 
recognized in its memorandum opinion, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  We must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  See, 
e.g., Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 
294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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(6th Cir. 2006) (“Finally, the worksite provision of the FMLA 
is an exclusionary provision in a remedial statute.  Following 
traditional canons of statutory interpretation, remedial statutes 
should be construed broadly to extend coverage and their 
exclusions or exceptions should be construed narrowly.” 
(citation omitted)); Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys., 
218 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We think, in other words, 
contrary to the position of St. John’s, that the concept of 
‘serious health condition’ was meant to be ‘broad,’ see S. Rep. 
No. 103-3, at 28 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30, 
and that the FMLA’s provisions should be interpreted to effect 
its remedial purpose.  See Hodgens v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 164 (1st Cir. 1998).”).  However, 
Congress explained that this purpose should be accomplished 
“in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of 
employers.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3). 
  
 Under the FMLA, an employer may not “interfere with, 
restrain, or deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise, any 
right provided under this subchapter.”  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).  
Additionally, “[it] shall be unlawful for any employer to 
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this 
subchapter.”  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).  “The former provision 
is generally, if imperfectly, referred to as ‘interference’ 
whereas the latter is often referred to as ‘retaliation.’”  
Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301 (citing Callison v. City of 
Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005)).  In any event, 
Bonkowski “does not dispute that if he was not qualified for 
leave under § 2612(a)(1)(D), i.e., if he did not have a serious 
health condition, his claims fail as a matter of law.”  
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Bonkowski, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 509.    Specifically, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(1)(D) provides that an eligible employee shall be 
entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any 12-
month period “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that 
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the 
position of such employee.” 
  
 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) states that “[t]he term ‘serious 
health condition’ means an illness, injury, impairment, or 
physical condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a 
hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) 
continuing treatment by a health care provider.”  In turn, “[t]he 
FMLA’s legislative history noted that ‘[t]he definition of 
serious health condition’ . . . is broad and intended to cover 
various types of physical and mental conditions.’”  Scamihorn 
v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 28); see also, e.g., Stekloff, 218 
F.3d at 862.  The DOL promulgated interim regulations in 
1993 in order to implement this new statutory scheme.  See 
The Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 
31,794 (June 4, 1993) (interim final rule & request for 
comments).  At the time, the department offered the following 
explanation of this notion of a “serious health condition”: 
 
 The term “serious health condition” is 
intended to cover conditions or illnesses 
affecting one’s health to the extent that inpatient 
care is required, or absences are necessary on a 
recurring basis or for more than a few days for 
treatment or recovery.  Furthermore, the 
Congressional reports indicate that this term is 
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not intended to cover short-term conditions for 
which treatment and recovery are very brief, 
since such conditions would generally be 
covered by employers’ sick leave policies.  
Examples of a serious health condition cited in 
the legislative history include heart attacks, 
heart conditions requiring heart bypass or valve 
operations, most cancers, back conditions 
requiring extensive therapy or surgical 
procedures, strokes, severe respiratory 
conditions, spinal injuries, appendicitis, 
pneumonia, emphysema, severe arthritis, severe 
nervous disorders, injuries caused by serious 
accidents on or off the job, ongoing pregnancy, 
severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal 
care, childbirth and recovery from childbirth. 
  
Id. at 31,799.  In the preamble to its 1995 rulemaking 
promulgating final FMLA regulations, the DOL observed that 
“[t]his scant statutory definition [of a “serious health 
condition”] is further clarified by the legislative history.”  The 
Family & Medical Leave Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2191 (Jan. 
6, 1995) (final rule).  Specifically, “[t]he congressional reports 
did indicate that the term was not intended to cover short-term 
conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief, as 
Congress expected that such conditions would be covered by 
even the most modest of employer sick leave policies.”  Id. at 
2191-92. 
 
 The DOL has adopted regulations that define the 
various terms incorporated into the FMLA’s definition of a 
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“serious health condition.”  Both the parties and the District 
Court appear to turn to the current version of these DOL 
regulations, which went into effect on March 8, 2013.  The 
current version of 29 C.F.R. § 825.113, entitled “Serious 
health condition,” provides that, “[f]or purposes of FMLA, 
serious health condition entitling an employee to FMLA leave 
means an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental 
condition that involves inpatient care as defined in § 825.114 
or continuing treatment by a health care provider as defined in 
§ 825.115,” § 825.113(a).  Entitled “Inpatient care,” 29 
C.F.R. § 825.114 states the following:  “Inpatient care means 
an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical 
care facility, including any period of incapacity as defined in § 
825.113(b), or any subsequent treatment in connection with 
such inpatient care.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.115 similarly defines the 
terms “continuing treatment,” and § 825.113 provides 
definitions for “incapacity” and “treatment.”  Furthermore, 
there is a separate “Definitions” provision, which states that 
“[s]erious health condition means an illness, injury, 
impairment or physical or mental condition that involves 
inpatient care as defined in § 825.114 or continuing treatment 
by a health care provider as defined in § 825.115” (and also 
incorporates the definition of “continuing treatment” set forth 
in § 825.115).  29 C.F.R. § 825.102. 
   
 In fact, the DOL’s FMLA regulations have a rather 
lengthy and complicated history. 
    
 The department initially promulgated interim 
regulations in 1993.  See 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,794.  Initially, § 
825.114 was entitled “What is a ‘serious health condition’?” 
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Id. at 31,817.  In addition to explaining, inter alia, the meaning 
of “continuing treatment,” this regulation stated that: 
 
(a)  For purposes of FMLA, “serious health 
condition” means an illness, injury, impairment, 
or physical or mental condition that involves:  
  
(1)  Any period of incapacity or treatment in 
connection with or consequent to inpatient care 
(i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or 
residential medical care facility; 
 
. . . .    
 
Id.  In turn, the interim version of the “Definitions” regulation 
(29 C.F.R. § 825.800) incorporated this identical language 
(and also defined the terms “continuing treatment”).  Id. at 
31,835. 
 
 The department promulgated final regulations 
implementing the FMLA in 1995, which were in effect from 
April 6, 1995 to January 15, 2009.  See 60 Fed. Reg. at 2,180.  
This version of § 825.114 carried the title “What is a “serious 
health condition” entitling an employee to FMLA leave?” 
and addressed, among other things, the meaning of 
“continuing treatment.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (effective to Jan. 
15, 2009).  However, just like its interim predecessor, this 
version included an “inpatient care” subsection: 
 
(a)  For purposes of FMLA, “serious health 
condition” entitling an employee to FMLA 
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leave means an illness, injury, impairment, or 
physical or mental condition that involves: 
 
  (1) Inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a 
hospital, hospice, or residential medical care 
facility, including any period of incapacity (for 
purposes of this section, defined to mean 
inability to work, attend school or perform other 
regular daily activities due to the serious health 
condition, treatment therefor, or recovery 
therefrom), or any subsequent treatment in 
connection with such inpatient care; or 
 
. . . . 
 
Section 825.800 then incorporated this same language into the 
DOL’s definition of a “serious health condition” (and, like the 
interim version, also set forth a definition of “continuing 
treatment”).  29 C.F.R. § 825.800 (effective to Jan. 15, 2009). 
    
 In 2008, the DOL revised its regulatory scheme.  The 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 
(Nov. 17, 2008) (final rule).  These FMLA regulations were in 
effect from January 16, 2009 to March 7, 2013 (and 
accordingly were in effect on November 14, 2011, when 
Bonkowski arrived at Butler Memorial Hospital, and on 
November 15, 2011, when he was both admitted and 
discharged).  It appears that, in 2013, the department “mov[ed] 
the definitions section from current § 825.800 to currently 
reserved § 825.102.”  The Family & Medical Leave Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 8834, 8835 (Feb. 6, 2013) (final rule).  Otherwise, 
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the 2009-2013 and the current versions of §§ 825.113, 
825.114, and 825.115 are essentially identical (at least for 
purposes of this current appeal).  It was actually the 2008 
rulemaking that first broke down what had, to that point, been 
a single “Serious health condition” regulation into three 
separate sections.  Accordingly, the 2009-2013 version of § 
825.113 was entitled “Serious health condition” and 
addressed the concepts of “incapacity” and “treatment.”  29 
C.F.R. § 825.113 (effective Jan. 16, 2009 to Mar. 7, 2013).  
Subsection (a) of this regulation stated that, “[f]or purposes of 
FMLA, ‘serious health condition’ entitling an employee to 
FMLA leave means an illness, injury, impairment or physical 
or mental condition that involves inpatient care as defined in § 
825.114 or continuing treatment by a health care provider as 
defined in § 825.115.”  While § 825.115 explained what was 
meant by the terms “continuing treatment,” § 825.114 
(“Inpatient care”) stated the following:  “Inpatient care means 
an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical 
care facility, including any period of incapacity as defined in § 
825.113(b), or any subsequent treatment in connection with 
such inpatient care.”  29 C.F.R. §§ 825.114, 825.115 (effective 
Jan. 16, 2009 to Mar. 7, 2013).  Likewise, § 825.800 provided 
a definition of “Continuing treatment” and explained that 
“Serious health condition means an illness, injury, impairment 
or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care as 
defined in § 825.114 or continuing treatment by a health care 
provider as defined in § 825.115.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.800 
(effective Jan. 16, 2009 to Mar. 7, 2013). 
  
 As part of the rulemaking process, the DOL has 
received numerous comments from interested parties, such as 
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employers, labor unions, and advocacy organizations, 
regarding the meaning and scope of the “continuing treatment” 
language in the FMLA, and, in turn, the department, has 
examined this “continuing treatment” concept in some detail.  
See 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,944-50; 60 Fed. Reg. at 2191-96; 58 
Fed. Reg. at 31,799.  In contrast, neither the DOL nor the 
commenters have devoted the same level of scrutiny to either 
the statutory concept of “inpatient care” or the department’s 
own “overnight stay” language.  As part of its 1993 interim 
rulemaking, the department expressly distinguished between 
the “inpatient care” and “continuing treatment” prongs (or 
“definitions”) of a “serious health condition”:  “FMLA defines 
a ‘serious health condition’ as one which requires either 
inpatient care, or ‘continuing treatment by a health care 
provider.’  Although the meaning of inpatient care is evident, 
the alternative definition raises difficult questions.”  58 Fed. 
Reg. at 31,799.  When it promulgated its final regulations in 
1995, the DOL explained that, “[w]hile the meaning of 
inpatient care is evident (i.e., an overnight stay in the hospital, 
etc.), the concept of continuing treatment presents more 
difficult issues.”  60 Fed. Reg. at 2192.  Most recently, the 
preamble to the regulations promulgated in 2008 included the 
following discussion of “Section 825.114 (Inpatient Care)”: 
 
 Section 825.114 of the proposed rule 
defined what constitutes inpatient care, adopting 
language from the current regulations.  The 
definition of “inpatient care” in current § 
825.114(a)(1) incorporates a definition of 
“incapacity,” which was removed from 
proposed § 825.114 and replaced by a cross-
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reference to the stand-alone definition of 
“incapacity” in proposed § 825.113(b). 
 
 The Equal Employment Advisory 
Council commented, “[w]e hope that setting 
‘incapacity’ apart will emphasize for both 
employees and health care providers that actual 
inability to work is a fundamental prerequisite 
for FMLA protection.”  There were no 
substantive comments on this section of the 
proposal, and the Department made no changes 
to the proposed text of this section in the final 
rule. 
 
73 Fed. Reg. at 67,947; see also Family & Medical Leave Act 
Regulations:  A Report on the Department of Labor’s Request 
for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550, 35,564 (June 28, 2007) 
(“The first regulatory definition in the regulations 
[promulgated in 1995] is a stand-alone definition from the 
statute—‘inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a 
hospital.’”). 
    
 While the DOL has indicated in its rulemaking that the 
statutory terms “inpatient care” clearly (or “evidently”) mean 
“an overnight stay,” the department has not expressly 
addressed what exactly it means by "an overnight stay.”  The 
parties, in turn, do not cite to any DOL materials or 
publications that address the meaning of § 825.114 (or its 
predecessors).  It is our responsibility to interpret this 
regulation defining the statutory terms “inpatient care” as “an 
overnight stay.”  The District Court and the parties have 
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proffered three basic approaches to § 825.114 and its 
“overnight stay” language—(1) the District Court’s “sunset-
sunrise” approach; (2) the “totality of the circumstances” 
approach offered by Bonkowski; and (3) Oberg’s “calendar 
day” approach.  Specifically, the District Court relied on 
dictionary definitions of “overnight, “duration,” and “night” to 
conclude that “an ‘overnight’ stay at a hospital is a stay from 
sunset on one day to sunrise the next day.”  Bonkowski, 992 F. 
Supp. 2d at 511.  Bonkowski argues that “[t]he totality of the 
circumstances demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether Mr. Bonkowski stayed overnight at a 
hospital.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 44 (emphasis omitted).)  In 
addition to defending the District Court’s “sunset-sunrise” 
definition, Oberg contends that, at a minimum, the terms “an 
overnight stay” refer to a stay from one calendar day to the 
next calendar day as measured by the inpatient’s admission 
and discharge times. 
   
 This Court ultimately agrees with the interpretation 
proffered by Oberg—although with one major modification.  
We believe that “an overnight stay” means a stay in a hospital, 
hospice, or residential medical care facility for a substantial 
period of time from one calendar day to the next calendar day 
as measured by the individual’s time of admission and his or 
her time of discharge. 
   
  In interpreting a federal regulation, we look to well-
established principles of statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., 
Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 156, 1 
60 (3d Cir. 2010).  While a court generally should consider 
dictionary definitions as part of the interpretation process, it 
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must do so with some care: 
 
“[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is 
the language of the statute itself.”  Consumer 
Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
[477 U.S. 102, 108] (1980).  When words are 
not defined within the statute, we construe them 
“in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural 
meaning.”  FDIC v. Meyer, [510 U.S. 471, 476] 
(1994).  We do not, however, do so blindly. 
 
 “[F]requently words of general 
meaning are used in a statute . . . and yet a 
consideration of the whole legislation, or 
of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, or of the absurd results which 
follow from giving such broad meaning to 
the words, makes it unreasonable to 
believe that the legislator intended to 
include the particular act.” 
 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, [143 U.S. 
457, 459] (1892).  In such cases, resorting to 
dictionary definitions may be helpful.  See MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., [512 
U.S. 218, 225] (1994) (stating, based on 
“[v]irtually every dictionary,” that “‘to modify’ 
means to change moderately or in minor 
fashion”).  Ultimately though, “[a]mbiguity is a 
creature not of definitional possibilities but of 
statutory context,” Brown v. Gardner, [513 U.S. 
 21 
115, 118] (1994), so the touchstone of statutory 
analysis should, again, be the statute itself.   
 
United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2014).  
“We look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary 
meaning of a word.”  United States v. Husmann, 765 F.3d 169, 
173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 
288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008)).  However, it is well established that 
statutory language must be read with reference to its statutory 
context.  See, e.g. id.  “After all, ‘[a] word in a statute may or 
may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional 
possibilities.  Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon 
reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and 
context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or 
authorities that inform the analysis.’”  Id. (quoting Dolan v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)). 
     
 Accordingly, “[w]e assume that ‘Congress expresses its 
intent through the ordinary meaning of its language’ and 
therefore begin ‘with an examination of the plain language of 
the statute.’”  Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  When the statute’s language is plain, the court’s 
obligation is to enforce the statute according to its terms, at 
least where the disposition is not absurd (or where a literal 
application of a statute would not produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters).  See, 
e.g., Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 263-64 (3d 
Cir. 2014); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
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F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  In the end, we should 
“avoid constructions that produce ‘odd’ or ‘absurd results’ or 
that are ‘inconsistent’ with common sense.’”  Disabled in 
Action, 539 F.3d at 210 (quoting Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutes & Statutory Construction § 45:12 (6th ed. 2000)). 
  
 The District Court relied on the on-line versions of The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary and The Oxford Dictionaries.  
We find it significant that the District Court did not mention 
alternative definitions of the words “overnight” and “night” 
that are set forth in these two dictionaries.  As the District 
Court pointed out, The Merriam-Webster Dictionary does 
define the word “overnight”—used as an adverb—to mean 
“for or during the entire night.”  The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, Overnight, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/overnight (last visited Dec. 11, 2014).  
However, it also defines the term as meaning “on the evening 
before” or “very quickly or suddenly.”  Id.  When used as an 
adjective (i.e., “an overnight stay”), “overnight” is defined to 
mean, among other things, “of, lasting, or staying the night,” 
“SUDDEN, RAPID,” “traveling during the night,” 
“accomplished by a mail service within one day’s time,” or 
“delivered within one day’s time.”  Id.  Likewise, The Oxford 
Dictionaries defines this term (used as an adverb) as “[f]or the 
duration of a night,” but the District Court did not mention that 
this on-line dictionary goes on to state that “overnight” could 
mean “[d]uring the course of a night” or “[v]ery quickly; 
suddenly.”  The Oxford Dictionaries, Overnight, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition.american_en
glish/overnight (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).  Like The 
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Merriam-Webster Dictionary, The Oxford Dictionaries defines 
the adjectival form of “overnight” as “[f]or use overnight,” 
“[d]one or happening overnight,” or “[s]udden, rapid, or 
instant.”  Id.  Furthermore, we acknowledge that The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary defines “night” as “the time from dusk to 
dawn when no sunlight is visible,” The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, Night, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/night (last visited Dec. 11, 2014), and 
The Oxford Dictionaries defines this term as “[t]he period of 
darkness in each twenty-four hours; the time from sunset to 
sunrise,” The Oxford Dictionaries, Night, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-
english/night (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).  The District Court, 
however, failed to acknowledge that this word is also defined, 
inter alia, as “the final part of the day that is usually after 
work, school, etc., and before you go to bed:  the early part of 
the night,” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Night, supra, 
and as “[t]he period of time between afternoon and bedtime; 
an evening,” The Oxford Dictionaries, Night, supra.  Given 
these various definitions, it is not clear to us that (as the 
District Court put it) “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word 
“overnight” in this context is ‘for the duration of the entire 
night’” or that “an ‘overnight’ stay at a hospital is a stay from 
sunset on one day to sunrise the next day,” Bonkowski, 992 F. 
Supp. 2d at 511. 
                     
 In any event, the District Court proceeded to adopt an 
overly narrow reading of § 825.114’s “overnight stay” 
language.  In short, its entire approach is premised on such 
extraneous factors as the time of year and the geographic 
location.  Simply put, sunset and sunrise times vary throughout 
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the course of the year (after all, everyone knows that “nights” 
are longer in the winter than in the summer) and are 
determined by the viewer’s position on the Earth (i.e., his or 
her latitude, longitude, and elevation).  Bonkowski provides a 
number of examples in which “the District Court’s narrow 
construction of ‘overnight’” appears to result in “unfair 
discrimination between different individuals who have similar 
needs.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 32 (emphasis omitted).)  The 
District Court relied on The Old Farmer’s Almanac to find 
that, in the zip code for Butler Memorial Hospital, the sun set 
at 5:02 p.m. on November 14, 2011 and rose at 7:07 a.m. on 
November 15, 2011.  See The Old Farmer’s Almanac, 
http://www.almanac.com/astromony/rise/zipcode/16001/2011-
11-14, http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/zipcode/2011-
11-15 (last visited on Jan. 5, 2015).  On May 14, 2011 and 
May 15, 2011, sunset occurred at 8:29 p.m., and sunrise took 
place at 6:01 a.m.  See The Old Farmer’s Almanac, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/zipcode/16001/2011-
05-14, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/zipcode/16001/2011-
5-15 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  Accordingly, an individual 
who arrived at the hospital at 8:00 p.m. on May 14 and was 
discharged at 7:30 a.m. the following calendar day would 
satisfy the District Court’s “overnight stay” definition—while 
someone who arrived at 8:00 p.m. on November 14 and left at 
7:30 a.m. on November 15 would not.  A patient would also 
need to remain at the hospital for more than fourteen hours on 
November 14 and November 15 to meet the District Court’s 
definition.  However, a patient who stayed at the hospital on 
May 14 and May 15 need only remain there for approximately 
ten hours.  We likewise note that, in Portland, Maine, the sun 
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set at 4:16 p.m. on November 14, 2011 and rose at 6:35 a.m. 
on November 15, 2011.  See The Old Farmer’s Almanac, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/ME/Portland/2011-
11-14, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/ME/Portland/2011-
11-15 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  A person who walked into a 
hospital at 5:00 p.m. on November 14 and was then released at 
7:30 a.m. on November 15 would meet the District Court’s 
“sunset-sunrise” approach if he or she went to a hospital in 
Butler, Pennsylvania—but not in Portland, Maine.  In turn, an 
individual would be required to stay at a Portland hospital for 
(approximately) one more hour than his or her counterpart in 
Miami, Florida (where the sun set at 5:32 p.m. and rose at 6:39 
a.m.).  See The Old Farmer’s Almanac, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/FL/Miami/2011-11-
14, http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/FL/Miami/2011-
11-15 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). 
   
 In fact, there are certain geographic locations where a 
“sunset-sunrise” approach does not make any sense at all.  In 
Fairbanks, Alaska, the sun set at 2:40 p.m. on December 21, 
2011 and then rose at 10:58 a.m. on December 22, 2011—
more than twenty hours later.  See The Old Farmer’s Almanac, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/AK/Fairbanks/2011-
12-21, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/AK/Fairbanks/2011-
12-22 (last visited January 5, 2015).  Accordingly, a Fairbanks 
patient who arrived at the hospital at 3:00 p.m. on December 
21, 2011 and was discharged at noon the next calendar day 
would not satisfy the District Court’s definition of an 
“overnight stay.”  In contrast, the sun set in Fairbanks on June 
 26 
21, 2011 at 12:48 a.m. and then rose on the same calendar day 
less than three hours later at 2:57 a.m.  See The Old Farmer’s 
Almanac, 
http://www.almanac.com/astronomy/rise/AK/Fairbanks/2011-
6-21, http://almanac.com/astronomy/rise/AK/Fairbanks/2011-
6-22 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  A stay in a Fairbanks hospital 
from 12:15 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. would thereby constitute “an 
overnight stay” under the District Court’s approach. 
    
 Given these consequences, we must conclude that the 
District Court’s “sunset-sunrise” interpretation produces 
“‘odd’ or ‘absurd results.’”  Disabled in Action, 539 F.3d at 
210 (citation omitted).  Although Oberg argues that this 
approach has a rational basis, we do not believe that it 
constitutes an appropriate reading of § 825.114 in the present 
statutory and regulatory context.2  See, e.g., Husmann, 765 
F.3d at 173 (“‘We look to dictionary definitions to determine 
the ordinary meaning of a word.’  See United States v. Geiser, 
                                                   
2  Oberg indicates that this Court should accept the 
“sunset-sunrise” definition because it constitutes a reasonable 
interpretation of § 825.114.   For support, it cites to Judge 
Rosenn’s dissenting opinion in Federal Labor Relations 
Authority v. U.S. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (en banc).  Judge Rosenn, however, recognized 
that the courts generally defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of doubtful regulatory language.  Id. at 774 
(Rosenn, J., dissenting).  As we have already noted, the DOL 
has not addressed the meaning of its own “overnight stay” 
language in its FMLA rulemaking, and the parties likewise do 
not cite to any other DOL materials discussing this concept.     
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527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008).  It is well settled, however, 
that a ‘word must not be read in isolation but instead defined 
by reference to its statutory context.’  Ali v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, [552 U.S. 214, 234] (2008).”).  This case involves a 
DOL regulation implementing a remedial statute designed, at 
least in part, to address problems associated with “inadequate 
job security for employees who have serious health conditions 
that prevent them from working for temporary periods,” § 
2601(a)(4), and to provide employees with the legal right to 
“take reasonable leave for medical reasons,” § 2601(b)(2).  
The District Court turned to FAA regulations, which define 
“night” as “the time between the end of evening civil twilight 
and the beginning of morning civil twilight, as published in the 
Air Almanac.”  15 C.F.R. § 1.1.  It would appear that the lack 
of sunlight could raise serious safety issues in the context of 
air travel.  However, the absence of sunlight, the time of year, 
the geographic location, and similar considerations do not 
have any real relevance to a regulation and statute designed to 
protect the rights of employees to “take reasonable leave for 
medical reasons.” 
  
 Although we thereby reject the District Court’s reading 
of § 825.114, we also determine that the interpretation 
proffered by Bonkowski is fundamentally flawed.  Insisting 
that the question of whether an employee has “a serious health 
condition” under the FMLA constitutes a question of fact to be 
decided by the jury, he argues that, given the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable juror could find that he stayed 
overnight at a hospital.  His theory, however, is based on a 
misunderstanding of the judiciary’s obligation to interpret the 
law and the jury’s responsibility to make findings of fact.  In 
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the end, we must reject an open-ended “totality of the 
circumstances” interpretation of the regulation and its “an 
overnight stay” language. 
 
 While juries make factual findings, it is the 
responsibility of the judiciary to decide legal questions.  This 
obligation clearly encompasses disputes regarding the 
meaning of federal statutes and federal regulations.  We have 
approached questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation 
under the FMLA as questions of law to be decided by the 
courts themselves.  See, e.g., Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (“‘Accordingly, 
we interpret[ed] the requirement that an employee ‘take’ 
FMLA leave to connote invocation of FMLA rights, not actual 
commencement of leave.’  [Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
582 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2009).]  The same reasoning 
applies here.  A reading of the statute that denies all rights that 
the FMLA guarantees until the time that an employer 
designates the employee’s leave as FMLA would be illogical 
and unfair.”); Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & 
Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 410, 412-17 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that supervisor at public agency may be subject to individual 
liability under FMLA).  Accordingly, it is our obligation to 
interpret the DOL regulation at issue in this case.  In other 
words, we must decide what the terms “an overnight stay” 
actually mean.  It is then the jury’s responsibility to dispose of 
any genuine issues of material fact on the basis of judicial 
instructions explaining the meaning of this legal concept of an 
“overnight stay”. 
     
 In fact, the two Third Circuit cases cited by Bonkowski 
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indicate that it is the judiciary that must interpret and give 
meaning to the FMLA (and the DOL’s FMLA regulations). 
   
 In Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Services, Inc., 598 
F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2010), we considered “whether a 
combination of expert and lay testimony can establish that an 
employee was incapacitated for more than three days as 
required by the FMLA’s implementing regulations,” id. at 156.  
Answering this question in the affirmative, we explained that 
“[o]ur interpretation is guided by the statute and the 
Department of Labor regulations” and that “[w]e interpret 
those regulations using our well-established canons of 
statutory interpretation.”  Id. at 160.  It was only after we 
interpreted the statutory and regulatory language to conclude 
that an employee may satisfy his or her burden of proving 
incapacitation through a combination of expert and lay 
testimony that we decided whether there was a genuine issue 
of material fact.  Id. at 160-61.  Applying this interpretation of 
the FMLA scheme, the Schaar Court determined that, given 
the doctor’s assertion that the plaintiff was incapacitated for 
two days and the plaintiff’s own testimony that she was 
incapacitated for two additional days, “a material issue of fact 
exists as to whether Schaar suffered from a ‘serious health 
condition.’”  Id. at 161. 
   
 In Victorelli v. Shadyside Hospital, 128 F.3d 184 (3d 
Cir. 1997), we similarly “disagree[d] with the district court’s 
conclusion that as a matter of law the condition [i.e., a peptic 
ulcer] was a ‘minor one,’” id. at 187.  Specifically, we 
concluded that the district court adopted an unduly narrow 
construction of the “continuing treatment” standard set forth in 
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the DOL’s interim regulations.  Id.  “Moreover, even if we 
consider the provisions of the final regulation [i.e., the 
regulations promulgated in 1995], we find that it neither states 
nor implies that Victorelli’s ulcer could not meet the 
requirements of a ‘serious health condition.’”  Id. at 187-88.  
This Court accordingly conducted its own analysis of the 
regulatory provisions in order to ascertain the meaning of the 
terms “continuing treatment.”  Id. at 186-90.  We then 
determined that “there is a material issue of fact whether 
Victorelli suffered a ‘serious health condition’ as interpreted 
under both the interim and the final rule.”  Id. at 190.  
Significantly, the Court in Victorelli recognized that “[a] 
district court’s interpretation of a federal regulation is a 
question of law subject to plenary review.”  Id. at 186 (citing 
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1995); ADAPT 
v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
   
 It is conceivable that a court could interpret a particular 
statutory or regulatory provision as establishing some sort of 
multi-factor standard under which the fact finder determines 
whether a particular set of circumstances meets this standard.  
See, e.g., Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418 (“As we recognized in 
applying the economic reality test in the context of the [Fair 
Labor Standards Act], whether a person functions as an 
employer depends on the totality of the circumstances rather 
than on ‘technical concepts of the employment relationship.’” 
(citation omitted)).  Even though we ultimately disagree with 
its interpretation, the District Court did at least adopt an 
objective approach that is relatively easy to apply and makes it 
relatively easy to predict whether an employee satisfies § 
825.114 and its “overnight stay” language (i.e., one simply 
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compares his or her arrival and departure times at the hospital 
with the respective sunset and sunrise times set out in The Old 
Farmer’s Almanac).  In contrast, Bonkowski contends that 
(given the requirement to construe the terms “serious health 
condition” broadly to give effect to the FMLA’s remedial 
purpose as well as the general obligation to view the evidence 
in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party in summary judgment proceedings) a reasonable juror 
could find that he stayed overnight at the hospital because the 
record demonstrated that: 
 
Mr. Bonkowski arrived at the hospital shortly 
before midnight on November 14, 2011; that 
Mr. Bonkowski was admitted to the hospital 
shortly after midnight; that the hospital 
repeatedly designated Mr. Bonkowski as 
“inpatient;” that he remained at the hospital as 
an “inpatient” until the evening of November 
15, 2011 [and thereby spent more than fourteen 
hours at the hospital]; that, while hospitalized, 
Mr. Bonkowski underwent comprehensive 
testing; that Mr. Bonkowski’s doctor wrote him 
a medical note excusing him from work on 
November 15, 2011 because Mr. Bonkowski 
was “hospitalized;” that the District Court itself 
referenced Mr. Bonkowski’s stay at the hospital 
as “inpatient;” and that Defendant referred to 
Mr. Bonkowski’s time at the hospital as an 
“overnight situation.” 
 
(Appellants’ Brief at 19-20.)  We believe that any kind of 
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“totality of the circumstances” approach would make it more 
difficult for both employers and employees to predict whether 
a specific set of circumstances rises to the level of “an 
overnight stay” under § 825.114 and lead to additional 
litigation in the future with possibly inconsistent results.  The 
adoption of such an open-ended approach could even 
encourage an employer to take adverse action against an 
employee because the employer may be willing to take the 
chance that the jury would ultimately determine that the 
employee’s time at a hospital did not constitute “an overnight 
stay” under the “totality of the circumstances.”  In any event, it 
is certainly possible—and even likely—that one jury could 
determine that a particular set of facts rose to the level of “an 
overnight stay” under § 825.114 while another jury could find 
that this same exact factual circumstances did not constitute 
“an overnight stay.”  Bonkowski suggests that a juror could 
rule in his favor because he or she may have had the 
experience of checking into a hotel in the middle of the night 
(e.g., 1:30 a.m.), falling asleep, checking out early in the 
morning, and being charged an overnight stay.3  However, the 
interpretation of a DOL regulation implementing a federal 
medical leave statute should not rest on speculation as to the 
personal experience of a potential juror concerning the billing 
                                                   
3  However, we find it likely the hotel would also 
charge this juror for an overnight stay (or an equivalent fee) if 
he or she checked in and then checked out in the middle of 
the afternoon (e.g., checked in at 3 p.m. and then checked out 
of the hotel at 4 p.m.) or the juror stayed past the checkout 
time. 
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practices in the hotel business.4    
                                                   
4  Bonkowski refers in passing to an on-line dictionary 
definition of “inpatient” as: “‘a patient who comes to a 
hospital or other health care facility for treatment that requires 
an overnight stay.’  Or, ‘a hospital patient who occupies a 
bed for at least one night in the course of treatment, 
examination, or observation.’”  (Appellant’s Brief at 45 n.6 
(quoting Medical Dictionary, Inpatient, http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/inpatient (last visited May 8, 
2014)).)  This definition, however, does not really help us to 
interpret § 825.114 and its “overnight stay” language.  After 
all, the regulation itself already defines “inpatient care” as “an 
overnight stay,” and, in turn, the on-line definition of 
“inpatient” does not actually explain the meaning of “an 
overnight stay” (or “occupy[ing] a bed for at least one 
night”). 
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Bonkowski similarly points out that he was designated 
as “inpatient” in the Butler Memorial Hospital’s records, 
Proviano (the head of Oberg’s human resources department) 
characterized his time at the hospital as an “overnight 
situation” (A292), and the District Court referred to his stay at 
the hospital as inpatient care.  Even if we were to adopt a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, we do not believe 
that such passing references by a district judge, a manager, or 
hospital personnel would be considered dispositive or even 
especially relevant to the outcome.  After all, Bonkowski has 
provided no evidence regarding the standards, if any, that 
Butler Memorial Hospital may have used in deciding to use 
the title “Discharged Inpatient Report” on his records, and 
there is no indication that it determined the time he spent at 
the hospital rose to the level of “an overnight stay” under § 
825.114 (and, in fact, the hospital records cited by Bonkowski 
never even referenced this concept of “an overnight stay”).  
As a layperson, Proviano’s characterization carries little, if 
any, weight in ascertaining the meaning of § 825.114 and 
whether this “overnight stay” language has been satisfied.  
Given its ultimate determination that “[t]he undisputed 
evidence of record shows that plaintiff did not stay overnight 
as an inpatient in the hospital” under its own “sunset-sunrise” 
approach, Bonkowski, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 512, we also refuse 
to read too much into the District Court’s passing references 
to his admission as an inpatient and the time he spent at the 
hospital as an inpatient. 
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 Having considered and rejected both the “sunset-
sunrise” definition as well as an open-ended “totality of the 
circumstances” approach, we conclude that “an overnight 
stay” under § 825.114 means a stay in a hospital, hospice, or 
residential medical care facility for a substantial period of time 
from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by 
the individual’s time of admission and time of discharge. 
   
 While he was not admitted until shortly after midnight 
on November 15, 2011, Bonkowski testified at his deposition 
that, when he was being wheeled into Butler Memorial 
Hospital, he saw a clock showing that “it was a few minutes 
before 12:00.”  (A279.)  He therefore takes issue with Oberg’s 
position that a patient’s stay in a hospital, hospice, or 
residential medical care facility should be measured from the 
                                                                                                                  
According to Bonkowski, the First Circuit held that 
“‘the [FMLA] should be interpreted broadly enough to 
protect absences from work that are necessary for the purpose 
of having one’s condition diagnosed and treated. . .’”  
(Appellant’s Brief at 45 (quoting Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 165).)  
The Hodgens court made this statement as part of its rejection 
of the district court’s determination that “‘there is no evidence 
that [his health] condition rendered him unable to perform the 
functions of his position,’ as required in 29 U.S.C. § 
2612(a)(1)(D).”  Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 163.  In fact, the First 
Circuit stated elsewhere in its opinion that “Hodgens does not 
argue that he received any inpatient care for his condition; 
thus § 2611(11)(A) does not apply.”  Id. at 161; see also id. at 
162 n.7 (“Subsection 114(a)(1), dealing with inpatient care, is 
not applicable here.”).        
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moment the individual was admitted.  According to 
Bonkowski, it would be absurd (and contrary to the remedial 
purpose of the FMLA) to exclude from the definition of “an 
overnight stay” an individual who arrived at the hospital at 
9:00 p.m. on November 14, 2011, was admitted at 12:01 a.m. 
on November 15, 2011, and was finally discharged at 11:59 
p.m. on November 15, 2011.  However, as Oberg points out, 
the Second Circuit has specifically addressed the admission 
concept under a similar statutory and regulatory scheme. 
   
 In Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 
2009), the plaintiffs were Medicare beneficiaries who received 
inpatient hospital care followed by care at skilled nursing 
facilities (“SNFs”), id. at 103.  Part A of the Medicare statute 
provides coverage for post-hospital extended care services if 
such services are furnished to an individual “‘after transfer 
from a hospital in which he was an inpatient for not less than 3 
consecutive days before his discharge from the hospital in 
connection with such transfer.’”  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
1395x(h)).  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) denied the plaintiffs’ claims for Part A coverage 
pursuant to two of its own rules, i.e., the so-called “’three-
midnight rule’” in which “a patient is eligible for SNF 
coverage only if he or she has been ‘hospitalized . . . for 
medically necessary inpatient hospital or inpatient [critical 
access hospital] care, for at least 3 consecutive calendar days, 
not counting the date of discharge,’” id. at 104 (quoting 42 
C.F.R. 409.30(a)(1)), and another rule providing that “‘a 
patient is considered an inpatient if [he or she] is formally 
admitted as [an] inpatient,’” id. (quoting CMS, Publ’n No. 
100-02, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, ch. 1, § 10 (45th rev. 
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2006)).  The plaintiffs (on behalf of a class certified by the 
district court) challenged CMS’s exclusion of time they spent 
in the emergency room or on observation status from counting 
toward the qualifying stay requirement.  Id.  Upholding the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Second Circuit 
explained that neither the Medicare statute nor the applicable 
regulation defines the term “inpatient” and that the statute 
itself is ambiguous regarding whether pre-admission time 
spent in observation and in the emergency room should be 
considered inpatient time upon the individual’s later 
admission.  Id. at 105-06.  Based in part on an analysis of 
CMS’s long-standing, consistent, and reasoned interpretation 
of the statutory language, it proceeded to accord Skidmore5 
deference to the agency’s definition of an “inpatient” as a 
person who has been formally admitted to a hospital.  Id. at 
105-10.  The Landers court concluded that “a Medicare 
beneficiary is not an inpatient within the meaning of § 
1395x(i) unless he or she has been formally admitted to the 
hospital” because this conclusion “is informed by CMS’s 
highly persuasive interpretation” and “it accords with the 
                                                   
5  The Second Circuit declined to apply the Chevron 
doctrine because the CMS interpretation of “inpatient” was 
contained in a policy manual.  Landers, 545 F.3d at 105-06.  
Under the Skidmore doctrine, an agency interpretation is 
entitled to “‘respect according to its persuasiveness,’ as 
evidenced by” its thoroughness, the validity of the agency’s 
reasoning, consistency, and other factors that give the 
interpretation power to persuade.  Id. at 107 (citation 
omitted).  
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statutory text and our governing precedents.”  Id. at 111. 
  
In the end: 
 
[W]e conclude this portion of our opinion by 
reiterating our core holding in this case:  in 
determining whether a Medicare beneficiary has 
met the statutory three-day hospital stay 
requirement needed to qualify for post-
hospitalization SNF benefits under Part A, the 
time that the patient spends in the emergency 
room or on observation status before being 
formally admitted to the hospital does not 
count.  In so holding, we expressly reject the 
rule of Jenkel v. Shalala, 845 F. Supp. 69 (D. 
Conn. 1994), which held that “later ‘formal 
admission’” of a patient following her treatment 
in the emergency room operates as “a nunc pro 
tunc ratification of her de facto admission at the 
time of her arrival in the emergency room.”  Id. 
at 71 (emphasis omitted). . .   
 
Id. at 112.  The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ 
equal protection challenge.  Id.  “CMS rationally could have 
concluded that a bright line rule measuring inpatient time 
based on formal admission would simplify claims processing 
and reduce administration costs, while targeting the program at 
the group Congress intended to benefit.”  Id. 
 
 Admittedly, this appeal implicates a different statutory 
scheme enforced by a different federal agency.  The Second 
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Circuit itself premised its holding on an express agency policy 
interpreting the meaning of the term “inpatient” under the 
Medicare program (and the Landers court explained that, “[if] 
CMS were to promulgate a different definition of inpatient in 
the exercise of its authority to make rules carrying the force of 
law, that definition would be eligible for Chevron deference 
notwithstanding our holding today,” id. (citation omitted)).  It 
is uncontested that there are no DOL regulations or policies 
expressly defining the word “inpatient” in terms of formal 
admission or explaining why time spent in the emergency 
room or under observation status does not count towards 
determining whether the individual meets § 825.114 and its 
“overnight stay” language. 
   
 Nevertheless, we believe it is appropriate to follow the 
Second Circuit’s example.  We accordingly conclude that “an 
overnight stay” under § 825.114 is triggered by the 
individual’s admission—and not his or her arrival at the 
hospital.  After all, both the Medicare and FMLA schemes 
incorporate the same basic notion of inpatient care.  While 
Bonkowski contends that (unlike in the Medicare Act context) 
there is a requirement to construe the language of the FMLA 
in order to give effect to the statute’s remedial purpose, amici 
in Landers actually challenged CMS’s definition of “inpatient” 
on the similar grounds that “the general purpose of the 
Medicare Act is ‘to provide affordable medical insurance for 
the aged and disabled,’ [Furlong v. Shalala, 156 F.3d 384, 392 
(2d Cir. 1998)], and that the Social Security Act is to be 
‘liberally construed and applied,’ Rosenberg v. Richardson, 
538 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1976); see Mayburg v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Svcs., 740 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 1984).”   
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Landers v. Leavitt, Civil Action No. 3:04-cv-1988 (JCH), 
2006 WL 2560297, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2006); see also, 
e.g., Landers, 545 F.3d at 103 (noting that Part A provides 
basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-
hospital, home health services, and hospice care for eligible 
persons over the age of 65).  CMS also declined to change its 
long-standing interpretation because, among other things, it 
did not believe that time spent in an emergency room prior to 
formal admission would, by itself, identify the severity of the 
individual’s condition.  Landers, 545 F.3d at 109.  It appears 
that an individual likewise does not have a condition that 
involves “inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential 
medical care facility” merely because he or she spends some 
time in a hospital emergency room.  After all, the fact that an 
individual is sitting in a hospital emergency or waiting room 
does not necessarily indicate that his or her condition 
constitutes more than a short-term medical problem that would 
generally be covered by the employer’s sick leave policy.  See, 
e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. at 2191-92; 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,799.  The 
time of admission also provides a relatively straight-forward 
and objective criterion to apply (and to predict).  In this case, 
the Butler Memorial Hospital records provided by Bonkowski 
expressly identified the “Reg” date or “ADM-DT” (but not the 
time that he first arrived at the hospital).  In the end, the time 
of admission—whether considered under the auspices of the 
FMLA or the Medicare Act—represents a bright-line rule that 
targets the persons that Congress (and the respective federal 
agency) intended to protect. 6   See, e.g., Landers, 545 F.3d at 
                                                   
6  In Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center, 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012), this Court determined 
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that a jury could find that the employee provided adequate 
notice about her need to take leave under the FMLA (i.e., 
sufficient information for an employer to reasonably 
determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave request) 
where, inter alia, she told her supervisor that her mother was 
taken to the hospital in an ambulance and was currently in the 
emergency room, id. at 303-07.  We explained that “[i]t does 
not matter that a person rushed by ambulance to the 
emergency room ‘might not’ require inpatient care as defined 
under the FMLA.”  Id. at 305.  Noting that data indicated that 
approximately 40% of people taken to the emergency room in 
an ambulance are “admitted for inpatient care” compared 
with just 10% of “walk-ins,” id. at 305 n.16, we observed 
that, “[s]ince many people in this situation do require such 
care, a jury might find that reasonable notice was given under 
the circumstances,” id. at 305.  Although it did not directly 
address the question of whether admission is necessary to 
trigger § 825.114 and its “overnight stay” language, the 
Lichtenstein Court did distinguish between the emergency 
room, on the one hand, and “inpatient care as defined under 
the FMLA” (and individuals “admitted for inpatient care”), 
on the other hand (and also drew a distinction between 
individuals taken to the emergency room in an ambulance, 
like Lichtenstein’s mother, and those who do not arrive in an 
ambulance, like Bonkowski himself).   
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We further note that a number of district courts have 
indicated that a mere visit to a hospital emergency room is not 
enough to satisfy § 825.114.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Dollar 
Gen., 880 F. Supp. 2d 967, 987 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (“Neither a 
trip to the emergency room nor an in-person visit with the on-
call doctor—both of which Johnson’s doctor’s medical 
assistant urged when Johnson called his doctor’s office on 
May 1, 2009—would have constituted ‘inpatient care,’ and 
Johnson refused either kind of treatment.”), aff’d, 508 F. 
App’x 587 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Anderson v. Nissan 
N. Am., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-525 HTW-LRA, 2011 
WL 4625647, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2011) (“The 
evidence provided by plaintiff to date does not support a 
conclusion that her husband’s emergency room visit qualifies 
under this definition.”); Santiago v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 
No. 05 Civ. 3035(PAC)(MHD), 2007 WL 4382752, at *15 
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007) (“Although plaintiff was seen 
once at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in late July or early 
August 2004, his visit was not ‘inpatient care’ as defined 
under the FMLA.  It is not clear whether plaintiff was even 
admitted on that occasion, but in any event, he testified that 
he was there for four or five hours and did not seek any other 
follow-up treatment.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 
328 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order).  But see, e.g., Schuler v. 
Branch Banking & Trust Co., No. 1:08cv378, 2009 WL 
3261683, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Jul. 27, 2009) (Howell, U.S.M.J.) 
(“The plaintiff has presented evidence that could be 
considered to show that the plaintiff did have an overnight 
stay in the hospital.  On December 24 and 25, that being 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day of 2006, the plaintiff’s 
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112. 
  
 Like the time of admission, a “calendar day” 
interpretation constitutes an objective “bright-line” criterion 
for deciding whether the individual’s time in the hospital rises 
to the level of “an overnight stay” under § 825.114. This 
should help to simplify any disputes arising out of the 
regulation’s “overnight stay” language (and perhaps even help 
to deter future disputes and FMLA violations because a bright-
line interpretation should put employers (and their employees) 
on notice of when exactly an employee is entitled to leave 
under the FMLA and § 825.114).  In addition, this reading is 
consistent with the purpose of the FMLA as well as the DOL’s 
own regulatory scheme.  Without more, an individual who was 
admitted and discharged by a hospital on the same calendar 
day appears to have (as the DOL put it in its preamble to the 
regulations promulgated in 1995) a “short-term condition[] for 
which treatment and recovery are very brief [that Congress 
expected] would be covered by even the most modest of 
employer sick leave policies.”  60 Fed. Reg. at 2191-92.  As 
Oberg recognizes, its definition of “overnight stay” as “a 
hospital stay from one day to the next, measured by the 
inpatient’s admission and discharge” generally constitutes a 
more liberal construction of the FMLA than the strict “sunrise-
                                                                                                                  
health problems had progressed to the point that she went to 
the emergency room at the hospital.  The plaintiff, on one 
occasion, spent the entire night at the hospital [evidently in 
the emergency room].”), report & recommendation rejected in 
part on other grounds & adopted in part, 2009 WL 3261665 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2009).             
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sunset” definition offered by the District Court.  (Appellee’s 
Brief at 17 (footnote omitted).)  For instance, an individual 
need not be admitted to the hospital before the sun sets (which, 
on November 14, 2011, occurred approximately six hours 
before midnight) in order for his or her stay at the hospital to 
rise to the level of “an overnight stay.”  We further note that, 
in any event, a plaintiff who thereby fails to satisfy 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.114 and the “inpatient care” prong of 29 U.S.C. § 
2611(11)(A) is not left without any possible recourse under the 
FMLA.  He or she may still be able to establish that the illness, 
injury, impairment, or physical condition at issue involves 
“continuing treatment by a health care provider” pursuant to 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(B) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.113 and 
825.115.     
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 Significantly, the DOL, like CMS,7 has actually relied 
on this notion of a “calendar day” to explain the scope of the 
alternative “continuing treatment” prong.  For instance, the 
current version of § 825.115 provides that a serious health 
condition involving continuing treatment by a health care 
provider includes, inter alia:  (1) “[a] period of incapacity of 
more than three consecutive, full calendar days,” § 825.115(a); 
and (2) any period of absence to receive multiple treatments 
(including any period of recovery) by a health care provider 
                                                   
7 As the Second Circuit pointed out in Landers, CMS 
adopted a so-called “three-midnight rule,” requiring the 
patient to be hospitalized for inpatient care “‘for at least 3 
consecutive calendar days, not counting the date of 
discharge.’”  Landers, 545 F.3d at 103 (quoting § 
409.30(a)(1)).  It appears that, under the CMS Policy Manual, 
the decision to admit a patient should be made using “‘a 24 
hour period as a benchmark, i.e., they should order admission 
for patients who are expected to need hospital care for 24 
hours or more.’”  Landers, 2006 WL 2560297, at *5 (quoting 
Policy Manual Ch. 1, § 10).  The Medicare agency has also 
created a “two-midnight benchmark,” in which “hospital 
visits that are expected to last less than two midnights are 
generally considered inappropriate for inpatient admission 
[while] hospital visits that are expected to last two midnights 
or longer are considered appropriate for admission,” and a 
“two-midnight presumption” providing that claims for stays 
longer than two midnights will be presumed to be generally 
appropriate for payment under Part A.  Bagnall v. Sebelius, 
No. 03:11cv1703 (MPS), 2013 WL 5346659, at *12 n.11 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 23, 2013) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 412.3(e)(1)).   
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for “[a] condition that would likely result in a period of 
incapacity of more than three consecutive, full calendar days 
in the absence of medical intervention or treatment, such as 
cancer (chemotherapy, radiation, etc), severe arthritis (physical 
therapy), or kidney disease (dialysis),” § 825.115(e)(2).  In 
fact, the department adopted—and has continued to apply—a 
requirement of three calendar days of incapacity, even though 
members of the business community would prefer, among 
other changes, a longer minimum period or a period measured 
in terms of business or working days and several advocacy 
organizations took issue with any minimum durational limit.  
See 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,946-47; 60 Fed. Reg. at 2191-95.  The 
DOL “concluded that the ‘more than three days’ test continues 
to be appropriate” on the grounds that “[t]he legislative history 
specifically provides that conditions lasting only a few days 
were not intended to be included as serious health conditions, 
because such conditions are normally covered by employers’ 
sick leave plans.”  60 Fed. Reg. at 2195.  Under the 
circumstances, we determine that a similar “calendar day” 
approach is appropriate for purposes of § 825.114 and its 
“overnight stay” language. 
    
 Although we largely adopt Oberg’s reading of § 
825.114, we do so with one significant modification.  The 
Court agrees with Bonkowski that it would be absurd to read 
the terms “an overnight stay” to include an employee who was 
admitted at 11:59 p.m. on one calendar day and discharged at 
1:00 a.m. (or even as early as 12:01 a.m.) on the next calendar 
day.  Accordingly, the individual must stay for a substantial 
period of time in the hospital, hospice, or residential medical 
facility (as measured by his or her time of admission and time 
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of discharge).  Under the circumstances, a minimum of eight 
hours would seem to be an appropriate period of time.  
However, because we need not decide this issue to resolve this 
dispute, we leave this issue of the requisite length of time for 
another day.  It is uncontested that Butler Memorial Hospital 
formally admitted and discharged Bonkowski on November 
15, 2011.  Under our “calendar day” approach, the time 
Bonkowski spent in the hospital did not rise to the level of “an 
overnight stay” under § 825.114 because he did not stay in the 
hospital from one calendar day to the next calendar day as 
measured by his time of admission and time of discharge. 
   
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed 
by Oberg. 
 
  
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.  
 In this case, we must interpret the term “overnight 
stay” for purposes of defining a serious health condition 
under the FMLA.  The District Court held that an “overnight 
stay” in a hospital is measured from sunset to sunrise.  Based 
on dictionary definitions, the test leads to results predicated 
principally on geo-location and the turn of the earth's axis.  
The majority rejects this test and I concur.  The majority then 
proposes a new test.  It defines “overnight stay” as a hospital 
stay from one calendar day to the next for a substantial period 
of time.  A “substantial period,” the majority suggests, would 
be approximately eight hours.  I believe this test is as 
inequitable and unworkable as the one it seeks to replace, and 
I therefore respectfully dissent.   
 
 Jeffrey Bonkowski suffered from a preexisting heart 
condition and diabetes.  On November 14, 2011, he began 
experiencing shortness of breath and chest pains.  In light of 
his appearance and medical history, Bonkowski’s wife drove 
him to the hospital just after 11:00 p.m. that evening.  
Bonkowski arrived at the hospital shortly before midnight.  
Upon arrival, hospital personnel wheeled Bonkwoski into the 
hospital prior to midnight.  Bonkowski was admitted as an 
“inpatient” shortly after midnight, where he remained until 
the early evening of November 15, 2011.  The hospital 
performed comprehensive testing, and made contingent 
preparations for open heart surgery, prior to his discharge.  
Under the majority’s rendering, although he spent in excess 
of fourteen hours in the hospital as an inpatient from 
admission to discharge, Bonkowski does not qualify for 
FMLA relief because he was not admitted and discharged 
from one calendar day to the next.  Because he was admitted 
 2 
 
after midnight, the time he spent in the hospital on the “day” 
of his arrival, no matter how long, will not count.  If, 
however, he had been admitted to the hospital at 11:00 p.m. 
on November 14th and was discharged at 7:00 a.m. on 
November 15th—a total of eight hours—Bonkowski would 
qualify for relief under the FMLA.   
 
 The majority’s approach is impractical, produces 
inequitable results, and is contrary to the remedial purpose of 
the FMLA.  “Congress enacted the FMLA in response to 
concern regarding, [among other things], ‘inadequate job 
security for employees who have serious health conditions 
that prevent them from working for temporary periods.’”1  
The purpose of the FMLA is to “to entitle employees to take 
reasonable leave for medical reasons,” but in a “manner that 
accommodates the legitimate interests of employers.”2  As a 
remedial statute, the FMLA is to be construed broadly “to 
extend coverage and [its] exclusions or exceptions should be 
construed narrowly.”3  Denying FMLA protection to an 
employee who enters the hospital one day and remains there 
                                              
1 Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 833 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4)). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), (b)(3).  This is effectuated by, for 
instance, requiring an employee to provide adequate notice to 
the employer.  See Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2012).  It should 
not, however, be accomplished by rejecting legitimate claims 
based on an arbitrary standard. 
3 Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 559 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
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much of the day, totaling close to nineteen hours, is, in effect, 
truncating coverage and construing exceptions broadly.  This 
denial is simply inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the 
FMLA.  While I prefer the majority’s test to the District 
Court’s test, I find that it removes only the geographical 
discrepancies implicit in the District Court’s proposed test. 
 
 In my view, the majority’s clear, “bright-line” 
approach is an inequitable one.  By defining “overnight stay” 
based on “one calendar day to the next,” we fail to consider 
the multitude of factors impacting time of admission and the 
realities of our health care system.  This is evident when we 
compare and contrast urban and rural hospitals.  An urban 
hospital might be overrun with patients who lack health 
insurance and seek treatment in an emergency room.  Thus, if 
an employee arrives at an urban hospital, he may be forced to 
wait hours before admission.  Rural hospitals, on the other 
hand, face their own problems: smaller staffing and fewer 
beds might cause delays in admission.4  The majority’s 
                                              
4 The average wait time to see a physician further differs 
between geographic regions and also by payer type.  In 2006, 
the average wait time to see a physician was as follows: 
Northeast (56 minutes), Midwest (50 minutes), South (61 
minutes), West (49 minutes).  When analyzed by payer type, 
the average wait time was: Private Insurance (55 minutes), 
Medicare (52 minutes), Medicaid (56 minutes), Worker’s 
compensation (41 minutes), Self-pay (62 minutes), No 
charge/charity (81 minutes).  U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, GAO-09-347, Hospital Emergency Department: 
Crowding Continues to Occur, and Some Patients Wait 
Longer than Recommended Time Frames 45-46 tbl. 13 
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calendar definition also fails to consider seasonal fluctuations 
in hospitals.  For instance, flu season typically peaks in 
January and February.5  If an employee falls ill during these 
months, the employee may face delays in admission not 
present during other periods in the year.6   
 
 In addition, an employee may face longer delays in 
admission depending on the day of the week he visits the 
hospital.  Mondays, for instance, are considered the busiest 
day of the week, while Thursdays are considered the quietest 
                                                                                                     
(2009).  While the difference in minutes appears miniscule, 
when we operate under the majority’s approach, a minute can 
make or break an employee’s claim.     
5 http://www.flu.gov/about_the_flu/seasonal/ (last visited 
May 7, 2015).  Studies have shown that January appears to be 
the busiest month of the year in hospitals, whereas November 
and July are the least busy.  Chad S. Kessler, M.D., et al., 
Predicting Patient Patterns in Veterans Administration 
Emergency Departments, XII Western Journal of Emergency 
Medicine 2, at 205 (May 2011).  
6 The CDC estimates the average wait time for all types of 
hospital to be over 120 minutes, or two hours, irrespective of 
these additional factors.  This is the time measured from when 
the patient arrives until he sees a physician.  
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6319a8.ht
m.  Under the majority’s approach, minutes are of key 
concern.  Thus, a delay of 120 minutes clearly can impact an 
employee’s chances of obtaining FMLA relief.   
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days.7  In fact, research has shown that there may be a 
“weekend effect” that “delays needed hospital care for 
weekend patients.  There is some evidence that hospital 
mortality is higher on the weekends for certain types of 
patients.”8  This may lead “care providers [to] rush to 
discharge a patient on Friday so that they are out of the 
hospital by the weekend.”9  Staffing on the weekend and “off 
hours” impacts admission and discharge time.  Whereas, 
“[t]he weekday hospital has a full administrative team, 
department chairs and service chiefs, experienced nurse 
managers, and a full complement of professional staff,” in 
contrast “[t]he off-hours hospital . . . rarely, if ever, has senior 
managers present.  Nurse-to-patient ratios are significantly 
lower.  Even the number of residents is considerably lower . . 
. based on mandated work-hour restrictions.”10  Indeed, an 
employee may be delayed admission based on the time of day 
he arrives at the hospital.  In 2006, the highest percentage of 
                                              
7 Kessler, at 205.   
8 Plan ahead to avoid hospital delays on weekends, The 
Commercial Appeal (Memphis), Mar. 15, 2010, available at 
2010 WLNR 5417578.  “Care delays on weekends might be 
worse if a hospital is already full.  Many weekend patients 
have to wait until Monday or later to get certain tests or 
procedures.”  Id.   
9 Id. 
10 David J. Shulkin, M.D., Like Night and Day – Shedding 
Light on Off-Hours Care, The New England Journal of 
Medicine (May 2008).   
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admissions occurred between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.11  
A study by a hospital consulting firm proved that patients 
who arrived in the emergency room between 7 a.m. and 3 
p.m. reported higher satisfaction than those who arrived in the 
evening or overnight hours.12  “By mid-afternoon, wait times 
may be on the rise as patient volumes have increased during 
the day.  If a shift change is occurring during a particularly 
busy time, it may add to any actual or perceived 
disorganization or delays for patients.”13  Elective surgeries 
may result in fewer available beds, further back-logging 
admission irrespective of the day of week or hour of the 
day.14  This practice forces ER patients to be “boarded” in the 
Emergency Department or in hospital hallways until beds 
become available.15  All of these factors impact a patient’s 
admission and discharge times and yet the majority’s 
approach is blind to them.     
                                              
11 Kessler at 205.  
12 Emergency Department Pulse Report 9, available at 
http://www.pressganey.com/Documents_secure/Pulse%20Re
ports/2010_ED_Pulse_Report.pdf.  The “[s]taffing patterns, 
patient volume, and acuity of patient conditions may play a 
large part in these differences in satisfaction.”  Id.   
13 Id. 
14 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-347, Hospital 
Emergency Department: Crowding Continues to Occur, and 
Some Patients Wait Longer than Recommended Time Frames 
2 (2009).       
15 ER wait times endanger health, Asbury Park Press, June 
28, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 15689777. 
 7 
 
 Furthermore, a temporal definition fails to consider 
transportation issues that may impact admission time.  These 
may include: variances in traffic patterns which may delay an 
employee’s arrival at the hospital; proximity and travel time 
to a hospital; availability of public versus private 
transportation; and seasonal weather issues such as snow 
storms, which may affect travel.    
 
 Finally, the “one calendar day to the next” approach 
also fails to take into account the intercession of everyday 
annoyances.  For example, an employee is being driven to the 
hospital at the onset of his illness, and his transportation 
becomes disabled.  He arrives at the hospital at 12:05 a.m. 
and remains in the hospital until 7 p.m. the next evening, a 
total of nineteen hours.  This employee would not qualify for 
FMLA relief.  But a separate employee arriving at 11:55 p.m. 
would merit relief.  Or, consider the employee who arrives at 
11:55 p.m., but because of staffing problems, the employee is 
not formally admitted until 12:02 a.m.  He would not qualify 
for FMLA relief.  Under the majority’s proposed test, we 
deny FMLA protections to the employees in both scenarios 
simply based off a few minutes difference in time of 
admission. 
 
 In light of the myriad problems we face in construing 
“overnight stay” temporally, I, instead, propose a totality of 
the circumstances approach.  There are many factors 
probative of an overnight stay in a medical facility.  Among 
the most important is the time an employee is formally 
admitted to the hospital and the time he is discharged from 
the hospital.  Instead of relying on an arbitrary cut-off time, 
the court can balance whether the employee was discharged 
an hour after being admitted, or whether the employee spent 
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fourteen hours in the hospital.  Another factor is whether the 
employee spent at least part of the traditional night hours in 
the hospital—tracking the DOL’s definition of “inpatient 
care.”  The DOL contemplated an “overnight stay” in a 
medical facility; thus, spending ten hours during the day from 
7 a.m. until 5 p.m. may weigh against a finding of an 
“overnight stay,” whereas spending ten hours from 7 p.m. 
until 5 a.m. would weigh in favor of such a finding. 
 
 An additional factor is whether admission was 
followed by an assignment to a room.  This factor is used in 
other contexts, such as Medicaid.  Medicaid defines 
“inpatient” as “a person who has been admitted to a hospital 
for bed occupancy for purposes of receiving inpatient hospital 
services.”16  Other relevant factors include the severity of the 
medical issue presented, whether the hospital ran extensive 
tests, and the hospital’s classification of the employee as an 
“inpatient” or “outpatient.”  The benefit of this analysis is that 
a court may assess the entire picture of an employee’s 
hospital experience and then determine whether that 
employee is entitled to relief under the FMLA. 
 
 The material facts in this case are not in dispute.  As 
previously stated, Bonkowski arrived at the hospital prior to 
midnight on November 14, and the hospital admitted him as 
an “inpatient” shortly after midnight.  He stayed at the 
hospital for more than fourteen hours, being discharged in the 
early evening of November 15.  While hospitalized, he 
                                              
16 Barrows v. Burwell, 777 F.3d 106, 108(2d Cir. 2015) 
(citing Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, CMS Pub. No. 100–
02, (“Medicare Policy Manual”) Ch. 1, § 10). 
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underwent comprehensive testing.  Under these 
circumstances, I would conclude that Bonkowski had an 
overnight stay in the hospital.   
 
 The majority fears that the totality of the 
circumstances approach would make it more difficult for both 
employers and employees to predict the circumstances that 
would give rise to an “overnight stay” and could lead to 
additional litigation in the future with possibly inconsistent 
results.  There are no material issues of fact in Bonkowski’s 
case, and I believe there will be no material issues of facts in 
most of these types of cases.  Events leading to an employee’s 
“overnight stay” at a hospital such as travel to the hospital, 
the day, date and time of arrival, the time the employee signs 
into the hospital, the time of admittance and discharge, and 
the employee’s medical report are seldom matters of factual 
dispute.  In such cases, I believe that the district court should 
be free to consider all of the circumstances presented and 
conclude whether, as a matter of law, the employee has 
suffered a “serious health condition” under 29 U.S.C. § 
2111(11)(A). 
 
 Several courts have held that whether an employee 
suffers from a serious health condition is properly considered 
a question of law.17     
                                              
17 See, e.g., Alcazar-Anselmo v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 
5246, 2011 WL 3236024, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2011) (on 
summary judgment, analyzing the “continuing treatment by a 
health care provider” prong of 29 U.S.C. § 2111); Helmick v. 
Solid Waste Auth. of Cent. Ohio, No. 2:07-CV-912, 2009 WL 
650417, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2009) (same); Whitworth 
v. Consol. Biscuit Co., No. CIV.A. 6:06-112-DCR, 2007 WL 
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 Similar to the majority’s approach, where the facts are 
undisputed in a case, the district court may, in its discretion, 
quite easily determine whether an employee had an overnight 
stay in the hospital weighing the factors I proposed.  The only 
difference is that a totality of the circumstances approach 
simply considers more of the evidence rather than solely the 
“one calendar day to the next day” approach that the majority 
proposes.  Where material facts in the record are disputed, of 
course, summary judgment cannot be granted and the case 
must be submitted to a jury—but this is true under any 
approach.   
 
 For these reasons, I dissent in favor of a totality of the 
circumstances approach.  Unless and until the DOL clarifies 
the definition of “overnight stay,” this approach offers a 
practical and more equitable inquiry into an employee’s 
hospital experience, and one that more fully comports with 
the remedial purpose of the FMLA.           
                                                                                                     
1075774, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 6, 2007) (“To establish that 
she was incapacitated within the meaning of the FMLA, a 
plaintiff must prove that she suffered from an ‘inability to 
work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities 
due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or 
recovery therefrom.’  29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i).  This 
determination is a question of law, and the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving the objective existence of a serious health 
condition that incapacitated her during the period in 
question.”). 
